AID AND MILITARISM
UNPACKING PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY EFFORTS IN ASIA

Issue Prepared by IBON International and the Reality of Aid - Asia Pacific
This Reality Check aims to contribute to strengthening and popularizing the discourse on militarization of ODA in Asia Pacific. Through unique perspectives from CSOs in the region, this issue discusses the changing mandates of ODA and how it is being diverted from poverty reduction to foreign policy priorities and global security interests of donor countries.
In 2006, The Reality of Aid Network published its Report on Conflict, Security, and Development Cooperation, which presented issues of conflict and security as serious aspects and concerns in development cooperation. An Asia-Pacific edition of this report was also released, recognizing the high prevalence of poverty and occurrence of conflict particularly in the region. These reports highlighted how fragility and security threats deeply influence aid assistance, diplomatic relations, as well as military interventions especially in countries experiencing conflict.

Home to already many armed conflicts, Asia Pacific continues to witness wars of aggressions and military interventions led by Western powers clad in their campaigns for peace, security, and democracy. For instance, the US is currently repositioning its aid policies and increasing its military support to its ally countries to counter the emergence and influence of China in the region. Since it has launched its pivot to Asia, the US has already conducted joint military exercises in Thailand, Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and South Korea.

However, to date, the issue of human security and the role of security forces remain a serious issue in aid and development effectiveness in the region. ODA funds, intended for poverty reduction in developing countries, are being diverted to increase military expenditure and support foreign policy priorities of aid provider countries.

Further, CSOs are deeply distressed that recent global aid trends show ODA commitments remaining largely unfulfilled and unchanged over the past five years. Trends also demonstrate significant diversion of aid resources to regions that “threaten” security in the Global North. Recent string of terrorist attacks are currently being used to justify the changing mandates of the ODA in favor of increased military spending while undermining the rights and needs of people living in abject poverty and conflict areas, particularly in the Global South.

This issue of the Reality Check, the official newsletter of the Reality of Aid Network, provides a focused discussion on protecting the integrity of development assistance for elimination of extreme poverty and vulnerability. This issue aims to advance the network’s campaign and advocacy against militarization of development aid by taking a critical look at how it undermines the development prospects of recipient developing countries in the region. By doing so, it hopes to contribute to raising awareness and building the capacities of CSOs and grassroots organizations, in that they may use the material in their campaigns, lobby efforts, and work on development effectiveness.
“Aid” in Context of Israeli Violations

Palestinians’ need for aid is exclusively a result of decade-long conflict with Israel. However, aid to both Israel and Palestine is militarized, furthering and prolonging conflict rather than addressing its root causes.

On the macro level, aid to Palestinians is militarized because it comes in the context of Western governments’ unqualified support for Israel, including impunity for Israeli violations of Palestinian rights. The provision of military aid, military trade, and other forms of economic, cultural and political exchange strengthens Israel’s ability to occupy, colonize, and dispossess Palestinians. Aid directly subsidizes the costs of Israel’s militarized aggression to Palestine, while international political support protects it from the consequences of non-compliance with international law, thus making aid actors complicit in Israel’s violations of Palestinian rights (Murad, 2014).

In fact, it is widely seen as “normal” for the US to provide military support to Israel militarily while also providing “aid” to Palestinians to mitigate the impact of Israeli military action. The US Government has

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provided $124.3 billion in bilateral (mostly military) assistance, making Israel the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II (Sharp, 2015: summary). US aid to Israel is part and parcel of US military strategy in the Middle East, and US investments have helped Israel develop one of the most technologically sophisticated militaries in the world (Sharp, 2015: 1). In contrast, the US provided nearly $5 billion in aid since to the Palestinian Authority since its establishment.

Critics of US military aid to Israel argue that it violates US domestic law. In their review of policy implications and options, the US Campaign to End the Israeli Occupation quotes the US Foreign Assistance Act as saying,

No assistance shall be furnished under this chapter or the Arms Export Control Act [22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.] to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights.

Ruebner (2012: 18-19) goes on to say,

The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (P.L. 90-629), which conditions and restricts the sale and leasing of U.S. defense articles and services, limits the use of U.S. weapons solely for internal security, for legitimate self-defense, for preventing or hindering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of the means of delivering such weapons, to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.’

US military aid to Israel may also violate Common Article One of the Geneva Conventions, which obligates third states to ensure respect for international humanitarian law in all circumstances (Do¨rmann and Serralvo, 2014). Others note that arms sales to Israel may be illegal because Israel, which is widely known as a nuclear power, has not signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Treaty, 1968).

Additionally, this aid when channeled to the Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank clearly violates basic rules of international law and hinders possibilities for a lasting peace.

Calls for a military embargo on Israel by Palestinian civil society do not only target US arms sales. The UK has also been under scrutiny for trading arms with Israel, including weapons that evidence shows were used in human rights violations:

In the six months prior to the attack on Gaza in the summer of 2014, the UK government granted licenses worth £6,968,865 for military-use exports and £25,155,581 for dual-use equipment. The licensed items included combat aircraft components, drone components, anti-armor ammunition and weapon night sights. Meanwhile, the UK’s Watchkeeper surveillance drone has been developed under a £1 billion joint venture contract awarded by the Ministry of Defense to Thales UK and Israel’s Elbit Systems, allowing the UK military to benefit from technologies that have been ‘field tested’ on the occupied Palestinians. (Wearning, 2015: 3).

Even in best-case scenario, the net effect of international aid to Palestinians is questionable because it is offset by military action by Israel’s military action that is subsidized by the US and others and granted political immunity by the international community. Palestinian critics of aid therefore consider Western donors complicit in Israel’s violations of Palestinian rights, despite efforts by donor governments to distinguish their political actions from their aid policy, suggesting that aid policy is somehow “neutral.”
Fragmentation and Militarized Aid

Israeli policies have fragmented the Palestinian community into several different legal/institutional settings, all of which are in some way militarized; and in this way, aid to Palestinians is also politicized and militarized in different ways. Aid policies and practices also contribute directly to political fragmentation between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, social fragmentation, and fragmented rights claiming.

Palestinians who make up 20% of the population of Israel are essentially colonized in a state that officially designates them as having fewer rights than Jews. Western aid to Palestinian citizens of Israel, which is limited and subject to Israeli restrictions, generally focuses on strengthening Palestinian rights claiming as minorities, which reinforces Palestinian citizens’ ties to Israel despite its Jewish identity, while simultaneously weakening their connections to the rest of the Palestinian community in the Arab world. By entrenching Palestinians’ identity as a “minority” rather than as an indigenous people, Western aid to Palestinians strengthens Israel’s territorial claims. In this way, aid to Palestinian citizens of Israel is politically and institutionally part of western support for Israel, regardless of what those same countries may say rhetorically about their support for Palestinian rights in international law.

The 3 million Palestinians in the West Bank also experience politicized and militarized aid, though the mechanisms are more complicated. The Oslo Accords (1993) and the Paris Protocol (1994) established a hegemonic political and economic paradigm within which all “development” in the occupied Palestinian territory takes place. Researchers Tartir and Wildeman explored the neoliberal interests that underpin the World Bank framework guiding Western aid policy toward the occupied Palestinian territory. They note that World Bank prescriptions “…do not take into account the history and human reality of Palestinians struggling to survive for decades under a violent military occupation” (2012: 1) and over-estimate the capacity of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to engage in demanded reforms given that the PA lacks sovereignty. Mandy Turner also suggests that the intention of Western “peacebuilding” interventions includes counterinsurgency. In other words, aid has sought to pacify Palestinian national liberation aspirations in Israel’s interest (Turner, 2014).

In the West Bank, aid policy is implemented differently in areas designated by the Oslo Accords as Area A (under Palestinian Authority control), Area B (under joint Israeli-Palestinian control, and Area C (under Israeli control). Donor policies differ in each area, with most controversy in Area C where Israel enforces (and most donors comply with) an illegal planning regime that denies Palestinians access to their own natural resources and to their right to development (Diakonia, 2013). By being unable and unwilling to challenge Israeli militarization in Area C, international donors contributing to the sustainability of the status quo.

While discussion of the political status of Jerusalem was postponed by the Oslo process, the practical reality of Israeli annexation of Jerusalem and forced transfer of Jerusalem’s native Palestinian population has not been challenged by international aid policy. The virtual collapse of the Palestinian economy in East Jerusalem renders the city essentially uninhabitable for Palestinians (Arafah, 2016). Effectiveness of both humanitarian aid (e.g. to Palestinian families whose homes have been demolished by Israel) and development aid, which is limited by Israel’s explicit Judaization policy, has been totally undermined.

The Gaza Strip is yet a different case; the Israeli blockade, now 10 years old, makes the Gaza Strip nearly totally dependent on international aid, as no materials or people can enter or leave through Israeli checkpoints without Israeli military permission. Meanwhile, the system of aid is increasingly controlled by Israel not by the United Nations, thus adding aid to the arsenal of weapons Israel uses to control Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. In fact, it is
precisely due to the militarized and securitized nature of the aid and the framework it is delivered (or not) that explains the lack of adequate reconstruction after the 2008-9, 2012 and 2014 Israeli attacks. Notably, having this aid delivered in highly securitized context makes it easier for donors to cover their failures using the excuse of “security.”

Lastly, about 5 million registered Palestinian refugees get aid through a dedicated United Nations agency, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA, 2016). According to critics, UNRWA’s ambiguous protection mandate has prompted debate about the extent to which UNRWA guards Palestinian rights or weakens rights-claiming through other bodies and mechanisms (Farrah, 2010).

Bilateral Aid to the Palestinian Authority

Clearly, military assistance to Israel is not the only way in which international actors subsidize the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Both Europe and the United States are main bilateral donors to the Palestinian Authority. In a scathing critique, Tartir says about 30% of international aid funds the $1bn/year security sector, which is not accountable to the Palestinian people and increasingly authoritarian. Since 2005, the US and EU have supported sector reform, but “...the central tenet of this project has been the entrenchment of security collaboration between the PA and Israel” not the security of Palestinians (Tartir, 2016). He notes that both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented the PA security forces’ excessive use of force and noted PA limits on freedom of speech, political participation and mobilisation (Tartir, 2016).

So, one hand, there is Israeli occupation and colonization that receives militarized aid, and on the other hand there is the Palestinian Authority that receives ODA and spends it in a highly securitized space within a securitized “development” process. So, however you look at the aid in the Palestinian context, it is driven by a hegemonic security rationale, designed to address Israeli security concerns, while making Palestinians feel increasingly insecure (Tartir, 2015).

Moreover, investigation into the militarization of aid highlights things: (1) how a liberation movement can be made to transform into a subcontractor to the colonizer as a result of this militarized aid; and (2) how this militarized aid may result in authoritarian tendencies giving dominance to security establishment and personnel at the expense of other sectors (e.g., health, education, manufacturing) and at the expense of democracy. In other words, in Palestine, aid did not only fail to address the poverty, employment and empowerment gaps, but also created new insecurity and illegitimacy.

Militarization of Aid to Palestinian Civil Society

Aid to civil society, both international and Palestinian, is also militarized. It is conditioned by anti-terrorism policies that directly contradict the humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality by requiring aid actors to vet beneficiaries on political criteria, which exacerbates internal conflict, including armed conflict (Hall, 2015). Israel benefits indirectly by the cooptation of Palestinian civil society to a militarized global regime; it also benefits because Israel’s already strong security sector profits from the export of counter-terrorism-related products now topping $1bn annually, according to the Israeli government (BDS, 2010).

This securitized and militarized aid has dramatic impact on the everyday life of the Palestinian people and their quest for freedom and self-determination. Evidence suggests that such form of aid is anti-developmental especially under foreign military occupation. It limits rather than enhances the capacity of the Palestinian people to claim their right to self-determination. This increases instability in
the long-term and increases the likelihood of further militarism and violence.

Aggression is a Crime That Should Not Be Funded By Aid

The use of aid to promote or support aggression is not only inappropriate and counter-productive, but arguably illegal. The purpose of our global governance system manifested as the United Nations is, first and foremost, “To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace” (Charter of the United Nations, 1945: Chapter 1, Article 1.1) Moreover, three basic humanitarian principles – humanity, neutrality impartiality– are enshrined in General Assembly resolution 46/182 (1991) and reaffirmed in innumerable UN resolutions and declarations (OCHA, 2009: 4).

While many Palestinians and internationals consider Palestine an exception to aid norms, the problem of militarized aid is widespread. The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States says that 30% of Official Development Assistance is spent in fragile and conflict-affected contexts (IDPS, 2011:1). The European Parliament reported that in 2013 over-two thirds of the humanitarian assistance recorded by the OECD was directed to long-lasting crises (European Parliament, 2016: 3). There are only two ways to interpret this data. Either international aid is having no affect on the perpetuation of conflict (and failing to stem the increase in humanitarian need), or, alternatively, that international aid contributes to increasing conflict.

The report of the UN secretary general on the World Humanitarian Summit takes a predictably diplomatic tone, but a careful read reveals acknowledgement that lack of political will is at the heart of aid ineffectiveness. It says: “...Addressing people’s humanitarian needs requires more than increasing levels of assistance. It necessitates a far more decisive and deliberate effort to reduce needs, anchored in political will and leadership to prevent and end conflict...” (UNGA, 2016: 1).

There is ample evidence in literature and practice demonstrating the relationship between aid and the perpetuation of conflict. Palestine offers one of many examples of how aid violates the principle of “Do No Harm” that is fundamental not only to the credibility of aid, but to the credibility of the post-World War II international system.

Aid must not promote or enable aggression whether actively or passively. In Palestine, even aid for ostensibly “purely good” purposes such as food, health, education, and water and sanitation, is implemented within a complex aid regime that serves the expansionist political interests of Israel and donor countries. A recent study by Aid Watch Palestine found that 78% of aid to the occupied Palestinian territory ends up in the Israeli economy (Hever, 2016), thus subsidizing between 18-30% of the costs of the occupation. Tartir and Wildeman also note that forced economic integration with Israel makes the Palestinian economy vulnerable; Israel has often withheld funds (with US support) as punishment for Palestinian policies it dislikes, including Palestinian pursuit of internationally enshrined rights through United Nations mechanisms (2012: 1.)

In another stark example, international aid utilizing the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism, to which the United Nations is a party, is being criticized as giving legitimacy to the illegal Israeli blockade on the Gaza Strip (Murad, 2015/16) and profiting Israel by giving international cover for Israel’s promotion of its own economic and military interests.
Conclusion

Aid to Palestinians is militarized on at least four levels.

1. Military aid and military trade with Israel is normalized, despite proof that aid is used to violate Palestinian rights under international law;

2. The Oslo, two-state framework within which essentially all Western aid is implemented reflects the political and military interests of the US and Europe and the World Bank-led neoliberal consensus instead of democratically determined Palestinian interests;

3. Development and humanitarian aid to Palestinians, whether funneled through international or Palestinian Authority institutions, is structured to protect Israel’s colonial monopoly at the expense of Palestinian security and self-determination; and

4. Aid to civil society, both international and Palestinian, is conditioned by anti-terrorism policies that exacerbate internal conflict, including armed conflict, in violation of principles of impartiality and neutrality.

Aid supporting Israel would not inherently violate Palestinian rights if aid actors (in their political and aid roles) held Israel accountable for compliance with international law. However, Israeli impunity granted by international actors has the effect of empowering Israel’s aggressive policies, thus resulting in what appears a shocking hypocrisy: donor governments and aid actors allow Israel to deny Palestinian rights while providing aid to Palestinians in ways that ensures Israel’s continued dominance.

Reclaiming Aid for Human Rights: Policy Recommendations

The militarization of aid to Palestinians cancels the legitimacy of aid as a credible humanitarian or developmental intervention. For international aid to reclaim its potential as a contributor to the realization of human rights, it must be embedded in effective accountability mechanisms that pressure all parties to comply with international law and respect human rights.

It is difficult to imagine that Israel will start complying with international law and respecting Palestinian human rights without some form of pressure. While there are examples of aid sanctions (e.g., US sanctions against Turkey, Indonesia, Guatemala, El Salvador, Argentina, Nicaragua, Zimbabwe, Columbia, Philippines, Pakistan, and Bahrain), these have rarely been used against Israel (Ruebner, 2012: 19-25).

On the other hand, the global civil society boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) campaign has had demonstrable impact on Israel's ability to pursue unaccountable military development (Juma’ and Mantovani, 2016). All concerned parties should study the potential of strategic sanctions to pressure Israel to comply with international law. The most immediate and obvious action is to demand for a total military embargo on Israel and all parties who fail to respect international law.

Empowering Palestinians means equipping them with the tools to resist Israeli settler colonial rule and enhancing their capacities for solidarity, resilience and steadfastness. International aid actors must recognize and accept that development under military occupation and colonization means first and foremost a process of confrontation to realize rights, including the right to self-determination.
References


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What is ODA for?

According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a forum of the world’s major donor countries, official development assistance (ODA) is defined as the aid for the “economic and social development of the recipient [country]” (OECD, 2008). Its purpose should promote development and welfare of developing countries (OECD, 2008; IBON International, 2009).

As of 2008, OECD definitions for ODA exclude activities that do not serve development purposes such as anti-terrorism and “direct military aid” (e.g. funding the purchase of weapons). There have been developments in 2016 indicating that the OECD shall include security-related activities under ODA (Mason, 2016), allowing possibly the use of development and economic assistance for donor security interests.¹

¹ ODA now includes more military and security-related spending (such as costs linked to countering violent extremism). These changes to the ODA definition concluded a four-year process within the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC). See DAC High Level Meeting Communiqué, February 19, 2016 available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/DAC-HLM-Communique-2016.pdf
However, in one of the earlier foreign aid programs such as the United States’ USD 13 billion Marshall Plan to help rebuild post-World War II European economies, American foreign aid also had the purpose of gaining allies against security threats – communist influence in the mid-20th century (Spear, 2016: 19).

Later on, in the 21st century, after the September 11 attacks, groups which have been classified as terrorist groups were considered to be important threats to US foreign and security policy. Counter-terror operations in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan included aid-funded development programs as a non-combat side to the war strategy. These aimed to slow down recruitment of terrorist groups by attempting to address the socio-economic roots that drive people to insurgency (Petrik, 2016: 172). As part of the global “war on terror,” US Special Operations Forces were also deployed to the southern region of the Philippines, in Mindanao (Robinson, Johnston and Oak, 2016).

As a “distillation” of lessons in such counterinsurgency and counter-terror operations, a US Counterinsurgency (COIN) Guide was released in 2009. Development continued to be seen as playing a role in complementing combat operations. This document can be seen as evidence of the continued overlapping mandates of military and development work for donor states such as the United States.

While rising powers such as China also had important places in US foreign policy after 2009, in particular during the US “rebalance” or “pivot to Asia” after 2012, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency remained a priority in American foreign and security policy (Department of Defense, 2012).

ODA to the Philippines

Throughout the 21st century, the changing security situation -- from “war on terror” in the southern Philippines to US “pivot to Asia” -- translated

**Chart 1: US military and economic aid to the Philippines, 1999-2015**

![Chart](chart.png)

Source of basic data: USAID database at explorer.usaid.gov/query
to shifts in ODA allocations, with the United States an important actor and donor state.

From 2001 to 2002, calculations from US Agency for International Development (USAID) data indicate that economic aid (which includes development assistance, disaster relief, health programs funds, among others) decreased by 35%, while military aid increased by 2700%, from USD 2 million in 2001 to USD 56 million in 2002. Development assistance itself almost doubled from 2001 to 2002, from around USD 27.6 million to USD 45.6 million. These correspond to the 2001 decision of former Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to support the “war on terror” in Mindanao.

During the US “pivot to Asia,” from 2012 onwards, the Philippines also became the number one recipient of US military and economic aid in general, taking the position from Indonesia. Comparing 2015 to 2011, the latter a pre-US “pivot” year, there was an increase in economic aid from USD 166 million to USD 293 million and military aid from USD 39 million to USD 90 million. This might be seen as reflecting the US priority of strengthening its military presence during the Asia pivot. In fact, US documents describe how military presence is essential in the “maintenance of peace, stability, the free flow of commerce, and of U.S. influence” in the region (Department of Defense 2012, 2).

As of 2015, the United States is the fourth biggest development aid donor to the Philippines, with ODA to the Philippines at USD 236.9 million in that same year (Devex, 2016). Other major donors are Japan (with USD 238 million), the World Bank (at USD 356 million), and the Asian Development Bank (at USD 803 million).

Also in 2015, the USAID, one of the major US agencies concerned with development assistance, allocated to the Philippines the highest amount of economic aid in the East Asia and Oceania region (USD 180.6 million). From 2001 to 2014, with the exemption of the year 2008, the Philippines remained second to Indonesia as the top recipient country of
USAID in the region. ODA alone also increased from USD 41 million in 2012 to USD 98 million in 2015, which makes the 2015 ODA allocation 139% higher than that of 2012.

The scope of USAID work

According to the agency’s official website, USAID is the “lead US Government agency” that works against poverty and for the strengthening of democratic societies (USAID, 2017). It is also a major US agency when it comes to delivering development assistance.

The USAID website describes that while the agency can “work in active conflict, or help countries transition from violence,” it considers preventing the emergence of violent conflict to be of the highest importance (USAID, 2017). As described in The Development Response to Violent Extremism, a USAID policy document, the agency’s programs aim to address the conditions or “drivers of violent extremism and insurgency,” such as economic inequality, lack of effective governance and corruption (USAID, 2011).

USAID describes how addressing these conditions concern development responses, in addition to “building the effectiveness and legitimacy of state institutions,” including local governments (USAID, 2011: 5). As a result, USAID programs range from good governance and anti-corruption reforms, youth employment, reconstruction in post-conflict zones, to basic service delivery.

“The Development Response” also shows how “stabilization” is taken into account in how USAID designs its programs (USAID, 2011: 8), and thus integrated into overall development strategies with countries. Stabilization here means “the process of making a country less likely to descend into...a state of conflict...and contributing to conditions that will advance sustainable development” (USAID 2011, 8). Other factors that the agency considers include country ownership and ensuring programs are “tailored...to the local environment” (USAID, 2011: 12).

It is also highlighted that USAID’s development response is ideally in combination with Department of Defense and Department of State efforts, since USAID’s development response is only “one component of broader USG efforts to counter violent extremism and insurgency” (USAID, 2011: 7). In a planning guide to coordinate US foreign policy objectives (called the “3D Planning Guide”), the same connection is made, where development is described as one of the three “pillars” in “promoting and protecting US national security interests” especially in developing countries (DoS, USAID, and DoD, 2012).

In the same Guide, aid is described as “always having the twofold purpose of furthering America’s foreign policy interests” and at the same time helping developing countries (DoS, USAID, and DoD 2012, 19). This is also in line with USAID’s description of how “successful development is essential to advancing our [US] national security objectives” (USAID, 2011: ii).

The scope of USAID work can also be gleaned from the Counterinsurgency Guide by the US Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative (2009). USAID is part of this interagency initiative, and has been given a role in conflict-affected areas when it comes to “enhancing institutional capacity and ameliorating the root causes of conflict” with “community-level programs...having a good track record in addressing the grievances that fuel insurgency” (Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, 2009: 52).
USAID in the Philippines: a development response to internal security?

Since 1996, USAID has been conducting “intensified assistance efforts in the conflict-affected areas of Mindanao” (USAID 2014). 1996 marked the signing of the peace agreement between the Philippine government and a Moro separatist group, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and this triggered the increased USAID activity “both [in] the areas affected by the Muslim separatist conflict, and the areas affected by the New People’s Army (NPA) insurgency” (USAID, 2014). During this time, USAID efforts ranged from infrastructure projects, to governance improvement, and to “reintegration of former combatants” (USAID, 2014).

From 2001 to 2008, USAID allocated USD 312 million for peace, security, and stability in Mindanao (USAID, 2008). During the same timeframe, “peace and security” results boasted by USAID included 834 barangay infrastructure and 40 regional infrastructure, and more than 28,000 former MNLF members practicing agriculture (USAID, 2008). These are activities undertaken in one of the bigger development projects during this time, the second iteration of Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM-2). The third iteration of this program (GEM-3) ran...
from 2008 until 2012 (GEM I was implemented from 1996 to 2001; GEM II from 2002 to 2007).

Until 2012, 60% of USAID budget for the Philippines goes to Mindanao (USAID, 2015: 12). These changed in the current USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategy with the Philippines, where a large part is allocated to national-level programs such as Basa Pilipinas, and the strategy’s general support to the market-oriented Partnership for Growth with the United States during its Asia pivot (USAID, 2015). As a result, only 10% is allocated for Mindanao, but still focused on “strengthening local governance and civic engagement to reduce conflict and violence in just six areas that pose the greatest risk of international terrorism” (USAID, 2015). This can be traced to the USAID policy framework against insurgency, where “service delivery and good governance principles, such as transparency and accountability” are important in “respond[ing] to drivers of violent extremism and/or insurgency (USAID, 2011). “Peace and Stability in Conflict-Affected Areas of Mindanao” is the second in the three development objectives in this strategy document.

The six areas mentioned above include the following provinces: Northern Basilan/Isabela City, Southern Basilan, Sulu, Zamboanga City, Marawi City and Cotabato City (USAID, 2015: 25). During this timeframe, one of the good governance projects of the agency is the Enhancing Governance, Accountability, Engagement Project (ENGAGE).

According to the same document, the whole strategy itself is an application of the policy framework defined in The Development Response to Violent Extremism (USAID, 2015: 24), which orients USAID development and good governance programs as stabilization efforts. As seen above, stabilization means conflict prevention, where making a country less susceptible to conflict includes dealing with economic and governance conditions that drive insurgency.

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<th>Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM)</th>
<th>Enhancing Governance, Accountability, Engagement Project (ENGAGE)</th>
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<tr>
<td>• around USD 500 million in 17 years</td>
<td>• approximately USD 7.3 million allotted since 2013</td>
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<td>• USD 98 million for GEM-3</td>
<td>• supports the six local governments’ “service delivery, accountability and transparency” (USAID 2016)</td>
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<td>• “umbrella” project with the following components: 1. local infrastructure development 2. preparing the workforce (e.g. English and computer literacy) 3. technical assistance to local government 4. business growth (e.g. encouraging commodity production for export) 5. integration of former Moro rebels into export-oriented farming.</td>
<td>• encourages engagement between civil society and local government (Development Alternatives Incorporated).</td>
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Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM) Enhancing Governance, Accountability, Engagement Project (ENGAGE)

• approximately USD 7.3 million allotted since 2013
• a five-year good governance activity in six targeted conflict-affected areas (USAID 2014)
• supports the six local governments’ “service delivery, accountability and transparency” (USAID 2016)
• encourages engagement between civil society and local government (Development Alternatives Incorporated).
GEM and ENGAGE: Peace and stability as another name for counterinsurgency?

In an annex for evaluating GEM-3, USAID describes the Philippine government efforts towards enforcing security in Mindanao as a “two-pronged approach:” using combat operations in areas with active violence, and efforts towards improving economic conditions “[t]o eliminate the resurfacing of violence” (USAID, 2014: 2). USAID then describes that it supports the Philippine government in addressing the same conditions (USAID, 2014; ISFI, Louis Berger Group and USAID, 2011: 12), and that the agency coordinates its peace and stability programs with other US actors such as the State Department, the Justice Department and the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) as part of the Defense Department (USAID, 2014: 2).

Both the GEM-3 (2008-2012) and ENGAGE (2013-2018) have been described in USAID documents as “peace and stability/security” programs. The objectives of ENGAGE has been described to be “improv[ing] the capacities...of local government units and civil society organizations and build peace and stability” in Mindanao (USAID 2016). For GEM, this is underlined in how assessments of the program include attempting to measure, albeit quantitatively, its effects on supporting peace.

However, according to a 2013 Asia Foundation report on various development programs in Mindanao, the “theory of change” wherein “improved economic outcomes or improved service delivery will contribute to peace building” remains an assumption that still would need to be explained (Adriano and Parks, 2013: xiv-xv). The same report also mentioned that in such development programs, there needs to be a monitoring of “transformative outcomes” and impacts towards peace.

The Asia Foundation report also pointed out the need to take local elite dynamics into account and how this affects both governance and occurrences of violence and conflict (Adriano and Parks, 2013: xiv-xv). In addition, these programs also need to consider the origins of the Mindanao conflict: its “agraria roots” in historical land dispossession and displacement of Moro and indigenous communities (Vellema, Borras and Lara, 2011).

In the Institute for Socio-Economic Development Initiatives and the USAID assessment of the GEM program, effects of GEM infrastructure and the GEM “commodity expansion” component were measured via incidence of violence and perceptions of peace (ISFI, Louis Berger Group, and USAID, 2011; USAID and Louis Berger Group, 2015). The reintegration of former MNLF combatants is also one component that supports that peace objective. This model assumes private sector-led development and facilitating engagement within established governance processes is related to peace and stability. This might be seen as a donor-led model which, at least, should consider the following: 1) assessing long-term effects of private-led economic growth such as displacement of communities and increasing inequalities, 2) acknowledging issues that might arise due to relationships of local elites to localities, and 3) factoring in fundamental economic issues of the peoples of Mindanao which are tied to a history of US colonial and government land dispossession in what are now conflict-affected areas of Mindanao.

While not an economic development program per se, the ENGAGE project is still oriented towards contributing to stability, this time through supposedly streamlining government performance and engagement with civil society. For a program directly targeting governance outcomes and stability, there needs to be more cognizance of local elite structures and dynamics -- which are not necessarily inscribed in formal institutions and practices of governance.

In addition, the peace and stability objectives of GEM and ENGAGE need to be reassessed in light of the established roles of USAID economic and good governance programs – and development in general –
in US national security objectives (as seen in USAID documents). Both GEM and ENGAGE, as peace and stability programs, attempt to change economic and governance conditions to counter the emergence of insurgency, from legitimizing government (USAID, 2016) to gaining popular support (e.g. address the lack of “community loyalty”) (USAID, 2015: 25).

In US counterinsurgency strategy, both appear as part of a “consolidation” phase, of attempting to render insurgent groups irrelevant, with “police”, intelligence, governance, information and economic programs assume the lead, and political leaders work to resolve key grievances and mobilize popular support for ending the insurgency” (Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative 2009, 26).

**US and Philippine state actors in USAID programs**

Also noteworthy is the participation of American state actors, and Philippine state actors involved in counterinsurgency operations, in the programs. Both the GEM project and the 2012-2016 *Country Development Cooperation Strategy* are outputs of the US Embassy’s *Mindanao Working Group*, a decision-making body tasked to coordinate “all US Government assistance to Mindanao” (USAID 2014), which is “led by the Deputy Chief of Mission” and made up of members from USAID in addition to the “Department of State, Department of Justice, Department of Agriculture and Department of Defense (USAID 2015). Their consultations of stakeholders for programming decisions had also involved Philippine government actors that participate in counterinsurgency operations.

For instance, ENGAGE was programmed after discussions with communities, local governments, non-governmental organisations and also with the Philippine Armed Forces (Peace, Prosperity, and Partnership in Mindanao, 2013). There remains the open question on whether civil society participation throughout this process was considerable and had an important impact to the Working Group decisions, and whether the Mindanao Working Group is mandated by the US policy of forwarding security interests through defense and diplomacy, and most importantly, development. If the latter is the case, this would be a violation of the national sovereignty of the Philippines.

When it comes to the GEM project, on the other hand, there is also a history of the program’s interactions with military forces conducting counterinsurgency and counterterror operations in Mindanao. In localities, civil-military officers from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were said to have a role in identifying which infrastructure project sites with AFP field commanders (USAID and Louis Berger Group, 2015). Correspondingly, infrastructure projects already built by USAID are also described as having “strategic importance” to the AFP (Stuebner and Hirsch, 2012).

For the GEM project, USAID also worked and coordinated its activities with the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P), and has declared that the agency’s “development programming works in conjunction with the efforts of the US. Military colleagues in Mindanao,” among other US agencies such as the Department of State and the Department of Defense (USAID, 2014: 2-3).

The JSOTF-P consists of US Special Operations Forces who were sent to combat and also assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines in counter-terror operations (Robinson, Johnston and Oak, 2016). Under the Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P), they were deployed in 2002 to conduct operations against the Abu Sayaff group in Mindanao. They operated within the country until 2014, allowed...
to stay and move in and out of Philippine bases (Docena, 2007).

They worked with USAID, accompanying the agency’s officers in visits to potentially unstable areas. On the other hand, USAID programs such as GEM strengthened the impact of their own counter-terror “civil military operations” (Robinson, Johnston and Oak, 2016).

In the 2012-2016 Country Development Cooperation Strategy, it is explained that the JSOTF-P forces attempted to strengthen the Philippine military, but a shift towards good governance initiatives later became necessary, given that the “six areas [chosen by USAID] continue to be safe havens for terrorists largely because local governance is ineffective and corrupt and is viewed as such by its citizens” (USAID 2015).

Overall, the participation of groups with defense-related and counterinsurgency tasks in development programming raises the issue of orientation of such programs – they are tilted to serve both development purposes and, alarmingly, security objectives of the governments of the United States and the Philippines.

Towards a lasting peace in the Philippines

The armed side of counterinsurgency in Mindanao was never halted, and has killed and displaced peoples from their lands, as discussed above. Together with the Philippine military and USAID’s development and good governance programs, these armed and unarmed components constitute the “two-pronged” approach to which USAID has declared its support (USAID, 2014; ISFI, Louis Berger Group and USAID, 2011: 12).

While development programs for improving economic and governance conditions are indeed necessary, there is a need to anchor them on the demands and rights of the people and their organizations, and not by implementing growth and governance models of the donor (even though these models might be supported by the recipient government).

This article also showed how it is in the security interests of the United States (via USAID), the Philippine military, and the Philippine government to maintain the blurred lines between development and military operations, as part of a strategy to legitimize counterinsurgency, disenfranchise dissenting groups, and prevent emergence of other potential insurgent groups. This has been done at the expense of addressing the deep historical and socio-economic roots of armed conflict.

There is a need to assert that security should not be defined by the interests of donor and recipient governments, protected via military forces and development operations, but by the well-being and interests of the people, especially the marginalised and impoverished. This involves addressing the needs and development priorities of the people, and preventing attacks to their rights to livelihood, land, among others. People’s organisations and civil society organisations who stand for the people on the ground must work on an alternative framework that avoids the subsuming of development under questionable security interests.
The Reality of Aid

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In February 2016, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) agreed to update and modernize the Official Development Assistance (ODA) reporting directives on peace and security expenditures. Accordingly, peace and security expenses for military and police trainings to ensure public safety in the partner countries, including the supply of military equipment and activities preventing violent extremism, are now included as part of ODA.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) are deeply concerned as aid mandate is, once again, being shifted to the field of peace and security, thereby promoting the geopolitical interests of the donor countries while risking the already small amount of ODA intended for poverty eradication and social development of developing countries.

South Korea is also not free from criticism of its use of their ODA for militarization and securitization purposes. The RoK Armed Forces have already been active in dispatching troops for reconstruction and emergency relief. South Korea has allocated nearly half of the amount of its grant to the Provincial

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Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan for a considerable period of time\textsuperscript{1}, and the government has recently sent troops for disaster relief apart from the inter-ministerial team for overseas emergency relief.

As the field of peace and security has increasingly becoming part of the mandates of ODA, it is evident that the militarization of South Korea’s ODA will also further accelerate. As a result, there are growing concerns that the ODA expenditure in the field of military and security will increase and the role of military and police in ODA execution will expand.

**Dispatch for military training:**

**Akh Unit in the UAE**

South Korean CSOs fear that cases similar to the troop deployment by the RoK Armed Forces to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) may be regarded as part of ODA as the scope of ODA expands. In 2011, South Korean government sent South Korean Special Forces unit to the UAE with the mission of training with UAE’s Special Forces. At that time, the government pushed ahead with the plan, saying that its objective is “to promote the national interest and improve the mission capability of our special operations forces in various regions upon the request of and consultation with the UAE.”

The training of special operations forces, technically, does not fall into the scope of ODA. The area of training for partner country military is limited to human rights and rule of law, protection of women in conflict and prevention of sexual violence, international humanitarian law, humanitarian response and disaster relief preparedness, prevention and treatment of communicable diseases, anti-corruption, and respect of civilian oversight and democratic control. However, if the Ministry of National Defense argues in the future that the partner country military training is included in ODA, then it would be difficult to verify it. This is because of the lack of transparency from the Ministry, which does not disclose the detailed activities of the dispatched troops. Although there is a condition that the training is subject to civilian oversight, it is very likely that the oversight system will not work properly. For instance, the Ministry of National Defense invites the members of the National Assembly and the media during the annual National Assembly audit to join the inspection team to investigate the dispatched troops, but the team consists mostly of pro-military persons in order to block criticism from the beginning.

More fundamentally, overseas dispatches aiming at military training have no legal grounds under the Constitution of the Republic of Korea. The Constitution stipulates that the RoK Armed Forces shall be charged with the sacred mission of national security and the “defense of the land” under the principle that they shall endeavor to maintain international peace and renounce all aggressive wars.\textsuperscript{3} In other words, if it is not clear that the troops were dispatched to maintain international peace, such dispatch is in violation of the Constitution. There were a number of news reports saying that the former Lee Myung-bak administration accepted the UAE government’s request for the dispatch to win the contract to build nuclear power plants in the UAE. The dispatch to the UAE practically was aimed at supporting economic activities following the nuclear power plant deal. At that time, the opposition parties in the National Assembly and civil society raised their voices in criticism that the dispatch of military troops for economic gains, not for ‘international peace’, constituted the violation of the Constitution.

\textsuperscript{1} The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) dispatched to Afghanistan and Iraq is a classic example of postwar reconstruction aid by the military. This is a kind of an appeasement policy to win the hearts of local people instead of a direct occupation policy that depends on advanced military technology. It is one of the civil affairs operations that the United States created in consideration of the specific circumstances and environment of each region. The comment that Afghanistan PRT is fundamentally unfit for development aid and difficult to ensure effective implementation has been made several times by international NGOs and emergency relief officials in the United Nations.

\textsuperscript{2} Motion to dispatch the South Korean troops to support the training of the UAE military, Nov. 15, 2010

\textsuperscript{3} Article 5(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea
The problem is that while the dispatch of the South Korean troops to the UAE is aimed at military training, its main purpose is to achieve South Korea's economic gains without considering the effects to the UAE and its neighboring countries. The dispatch to the UAE has been extended for several times indefinitely. In September 2016, the government once again demanded the extension of the dispatch, openly stating that the export volume of goods after the dispatch of Akh Unit increased by about 40% from USD 21.8 billion to USD 31.3 billion, and the arms export also increased by a whopping 30 times.4

Moreover, no evaluation or review was done to see whether South Korean forces’ military training program in the UAE has brought about positive results in maintaining peace in the international community and contributed to the maintenance of peace in developing nations, or just been used as a tool for repressing human rights. During the democratization protests in Bahrain in 2011, the Bahraini authorities repressed the protesters by mobilizing troops of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. There were strong doubts that the RoK Armed Forces trained the UAE forces. Nevertheless, the government failed to investigate such suspicions or give clear answers.

The dispatch under the name of military training can be abused; the troops can be used for the economic and military benefits of the dispatching countries instead of social development or peacekeeping of developing countries. This practice can also serve as a basis for indiscriminate dispatches. Considering that the presence of foreign military troops may have negative effects on local society and state of neighboring countries, the dispatch of troops requires a very prudent approach even if it were for only training.

4 Review report on the motion to extend the dispatch of the South Korean troops to support the education and training of the UAE military dated November 2016

Dispatch for Disaster Relief: Araw Contingent in the Philippines

Dispatch of troops in the fields of emergency relief and disaster response has been on a gradual increase. The first troop dispatched overseas by the RoK Armed Forces for disaster recovery and humanitarian aid was the Araw Contingent that was sent to the Philippines, which suffered from the deadliest Philippine typhoon in its history in November 2013. However, the activities of Araw Contingent in the Philippines raised concerns whether the deployment for the purpose of emergency relief was appropriate. Its main tasks included: (1) restoring public facilities and cleaning up disaster stricken areas, (2) providing free medical services and activities to prevent epidemics, (3) running vocational schools and Korean language programs, (4) providing feeding programs, and (5) screening movies. Some of activities were implemented through NGOs with the request from the troop. In addition to those tasks, the troop performed activities that had nothing to do with reconstruction and relief, such as the construction of Araw Memorial Park honoring the dispatch of the RoK Armed Forces and the building of a statue commemorating the joint operation for restoration. Although the Philippines is a country with high demand for learning Korean language, it is hard to say that the troop's running Korean classes was an appropriate task immediately after the disaster as they were irrelevant to the restoration and recovery works. Korean classes, vocational training and movie nights are projects that are out of the scope of emergency relief; they are inadequate to be executed as part of the main tasks of Araw Contingent from the perspective of development effectiveness.

Moreover, prior to sending the Araw Contingent, South Korean government had already sent the Korea Disaster Relief Team (KDRT) as part of its Overseas Emergency Relief Act, which mandates RoK to organize an overseas emergency relief team in specialized areas, conduct rescues and emergency medical service, health care, and international
development. Under the Act, the RoK Armed Forces can also provide what fits the needs, such as military transport aircraft or carrier, and rapid transport of personnel or supplies for emergency rescue or relief, upon the request of the Public and Private Joint Council for Overseas Emergency Relief. Nonetheless, the Ministry of National Defense decided to send the troops apart from the Korea Disaster Relief Team. This is against the Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defense Assets In Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines), which state that “military and civil defense assets should be seen as a tool complementing existing relief mechanisms” and “should be employed as a last resort only in the absence of any other comparable civilian alternative.”

Some evaluated that diplomatic and military considerations of South Korean government had an influence on the decision of dispatch. For instance, when the Philippines faced growing tensions with China over territorial sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal in South China Sea (Huangyan Dao in Chinese), it resumed its joint military exercise with the US Armed Forces. The US military planned to station in the Philippines again in the form of rotating forces starting from 2013. In the meantime, the country suffered from damages wrought by typhoon Haiyan. South Korea sent troops to the Philippines along with the US, Japan and Australia. Later, the US government evaluated that its military’s aid in the Philippines typhoon relief was a great help in enhancing the military cooperation between the US and the Philippines.5

It is unavoidable that the political, diplomatic, and military factors of both the country sending the troops and the country accepting their presence are taken into account. The dispatch of troops to a no-conflict region also should be done in a most discreet manner, considering that it can be used as an arbitrary means of one party resulting in unintended ripple effects in and out of the country when done unreasonably without any solid principle. For this reason, we cannot help but be critical of including the mobilization of military for humanitarian activities in the scope of ODA.

Police Training Program: “K-Police Wave”

As the scope of ODA expanded last year, financing for routine civil policing functions - the promotion of public safety and preventing and addressing criminal activities - police training became part of ODA. As a matter of fact, since 2014, South Korea started to introduce more programs through ODA that are related to reforming the police system and enhancing officers’ capabilities in the partner countries. ODA statistics for the past decade show that the amount spent in public safety sector rose sharply by fivefold from USD 3 million in 2006 to USD 16 million in 2015. Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and the Korean National Police Agency (KNPA) signed a memorandum of understanding for grant aid in the field of public safety in developing countries in October 2014, and have expanded their projects ever since. KNPA has conducted KOICA Fellowship Programs from 2005 to present, and shared the knowledge and know-how on public safety system with developing nations by providing equipment to police officers and sending technical experts. Furthermore, the number of the fellowship programs carried out by KOICA in cooperation with the KNPA for the past six years (2010-2015) was on a rapid increase, reaching 54 programs as of 2015. They call this police-training program “K-Police Wave”.

In general, it is considered to be an important part of development cooperation to provide support for the reform of national security system from a perspective of improving governance. Whether the training provided through ‘K-Police Wave’ satisfies the human rights standards still remain a question from the international community.

5 Congressional Research Service, Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda): U.S. and International Response to Philippines Disaster. 2014.2.10
According to media reports, the training provided by South Korean police is mainly about public safety techniques to repress protesters. The demands are high for water cannon trucks and a human barricade for female police officers. In 2013-2014 South Korean firms sold USD 60 million of gear to Oman, including 57 water cannon trucks and riot shields. They also exported USD 16 million of water cannon trucks to Indonesia in 2010.

What is worrisome is that undemocratic leaders could use South Korea’s protest-management skills trainings and Korean-made equipment to quash dissent and quell democratization rallies. When Maina Kiai, UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, visited South Korea in January 2016, he said that the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association have been in a gradual regression in South Korea for the past few years and expressed concern over police tactics used against demonstrators during rallies, such as water cannons and bus barricades. Of particular note is Mr. Baek Nam-gi, a farmer activist, who was left in a comatose after being pummeled by water cannons at a demonstration in Seoul on 14 November 2015 and passed away after 317 days in a coma. With these in mind, it is hard to assure that the police of the partner countries, which trained the public safety and protest-management skills shared under the name of ‘K-Police Wave’, would not violate the rights of their fellow citizens.

Passing down the equipment used to suppress demonstrations, such as water cannon trucks, is not the only problem. In fact, KOICA has implemented ‘The Project for Enhancing Criminal Investigation Capability of the Philippines National Police (2016-2018)’ with funding of USD 6.6 million. This project is about providing police equipment worth USD 4 million (e.g. patrol cars, patrol motorcycles, investigation devices), dispatching some 60 South Korean experts, and inviting some 50 local officers to South Korea for training.

Not only does the Philippines suffer from poor public safety, but its police corruption is also known.
so rampant that police officers are often involved in violent crimes, such as murder, kidnapping, extortion, robbery, and drug dealing. A local media outlet Manila Standard released that the Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines are the most corrupt government agencies. The repression of human rights by the Philippine police resulting from abusing its authority is another problem. In April 2016, Philippine police opened fire at a protest by thousands of rice farmers who are demanding government assistance after severe drought, leading to three people being killed and dozens wounded. In addition, in October 2016, as the police broke up a large-scale anti-US rally outside the American embassy in Manila, a police van made in Korea rammed protesters. Still, South Korean government has not stopped providing the training and equipment to the Philippines police. As such, without close monitoring and evaluation of the effects of the equipment and training provided by a country on the partner country, the police training support for the partner country can be rather destructive.

**Conclusion**

By extending aid rules to include more peace and security costs, there is deep concern that using aid to finance peace and security activities greatly risk poverty eradication and development efforts over the years. It is also difficult to assure that the human rights of the residents in the partner countries and their neighboring countries will be protected. As seen in South Korea’s case, when aid is used as political and

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<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
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<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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Source: The Dong-A Ilbo, Apr. 7, 2015
military means, it becomes far from its goals -- poverty eradication and social development of the partner countries. This is confirmed by a long history of failure in development cooperation in the past. Such misuse of the aid is highly likely to result in disputes and conflicts. It would be absurd to expand the scope of ODA so that it can be used as military and diplomatic tools despite all the side effects mentioned above.

The Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the international community are based on values of democracy, human rights and peace. On this basis, South Korean government should carefully examine the possible impact of ODA on the democracy, human rights and peace of the partner countries, and ensure monitoring and participation of civil society in the process of ODA policy-making.
The Reality of Aid Network exists to promote national and international policies that will contribute to a new and effective strategy for poverty eradication, built on solidarity and equity.

Established in 1993, The Reality of Aid is a collaborative, not-for-profit initiative, involving non-governmental organisations from North and South.

The Reality of Aid publishes regular and reliable reports on international development cooperation and the extent to which governments in the North and South address the extreme inequalities of income and the structural, social, and political injustices that entrench people in poverty.

Leo Atakpu of the Africa Network for Environment and Economic Justice currently chairs the Reality of Aid International Coordinating Committee.

The International Coordinating Committee is composed of coordinators of component regional networks (RoA Africa, RoA Asia/Pacific, and LATINDADD for Latin America), Canadian Council for International Cooperation, European Network on Debt and Development (EURODAD), and the Global Secretariat Coordinator.