



Political Economy of Foreign Aid in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: A Conceptual Framing

Jeremy Wildeman and Alaa Tartir

INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

Over US\$40 billion has been spent since 1993 by international donors as foreign aid for Palestinians living in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) (OECD 2020). This development “investment” in peace centered on Palestinian institution building and reform has made them one of the highest per capita recipients of non-military aid in the world. Of the US\$40 billion, around US\$30 billion (75% of the total aid) was allocated between 2007 and 2019, according to the OCED aid database. On average, over the past decade US\$2.2 billion of aid

J. Wildeman (✉)

Human Rights Resource and Education Centre, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada

A. Tartir

The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID), Geneva, Switzerland
e-mail: alaa.tartir@graduateinstitute.ch

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021

223

A. Tartir et al. (eds.), *Political Economy of Palestine*, Middle East Today, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68643-7_10

funds were poured annually into the Palestinian economy, representing around 20% of the WBGs's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and around US\$520 per capita aid per year in a low-income economy. In spite of those sums, however, peace and development remain elusive, and this aid has failed to achieve its three main objectives: lasting peace, effective and accountable (democratic) Palestinian institutions, and sustainable socio-economic development (Wildeman and Tartir 2013, 2014; Knudsen and Tartir 2017; Wildeman 2018a). Instead, Palestinians have been forced to live in an aid-development paradox: large amounts of aid associated with a downward decline in socioeconomic and human development indicators (Tartir 2017a). In cases like Gaza, those declines have been dystopian (Roy 2016).

Following nearly three decades of foreign aid intervention meant to induce development and growth, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) recently concluded that “in 2018 and early 2019, the performance of the Palestinian economy and humanitarian conditions reached an all-time low. Per capita income fell, mass unemployment increased, poverty deepened and the environmental toll of occupation has been rising in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank” (UNCTAD 2019, 1). The prospects for the Palestinian economy, according to the UNCTAD report, are “grim because the sources of growth that have propelled it in the last two decades are disappearing, while the constraints imposed by prolonged occupation persist and worsen” (UNCTAD 2019, 2). This was before the Trump administration announced its “Peace to Prosperity” plan meant to offer Israel the opportunity to move from *de facto* to *de jure* annexation of the rest of the occupied West Bank, which was expected to lead to further forced transfers of Palestinians from non-urban centers, accompanied by further aid packages (White House 2020; Baconi 2020).

Thus, following decades of Israeli settler colonialism of Palestine and a failed “peace process” (Hawari 2020), the Palestinian economy has experienced a pervasive process of *de-development* that has deprived it of its transformative potential while expanding Israel’s colonial dominance. It is a phenomenon first identified by Roy in 1987 in her research on Gaza. When it occurs, normal economic relations are impaired or abandoned, preventing any logical or rational arrangement of the economy or its constituent parts, diminishing productive capacity and precluding sustainable growth. De-development involves the “deliberate, systematic

and progressive dismemberment of an indigenous economy by a dominant one, where economic – and by extension, societal – potential is not only distorted but denied” (Roy 2007, 33). It forestalls development by “depriving or ridding the economy of its capacity and potential for rational structural transformation [i.e. natural patterns of growth and development] and preventing the emergence of any self-correcting measures” (Roy 1995, 128). It “undermines or weakens the ability of an economy to grow and expand by preventing it from accessing and utilizing critical inputs needed to promote internal growth beyond a specific structural level” (Roy 1987). Over time, de-development represents nothing less than the denial of economic potential (Roy 2014). In the case of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), de-development represents a deliberate and focused settler colonial strategy.

This chapter explores the aid and de-development nexus by identifying key features, underpinning assumptions, and arguments of four approaches, starting from 1993 when the Oslo Accord was signed and the World Bank first put in place a framework to support the Oslo Peace Process (World Bank 1993). Recognizing that the causes of de-development are fundamentally and inherently political, a political economy understanding of the relationship between aid and development is the apt way to appreciate the complexity of this relationship in the Palestinian context. This analysis finds that the foreign aid intervention in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) can be organized into four conceptual categories: *Instrumentalism*; *Critical Instrumentalism*; *The Critics*; and *Neocolonialism*. It discusses these four approaches by synthesizing and categorizing arguments in the literature on Palestine Studies and Development Studies in an attempt to conceptualize the process by which aid is given and understand the result in the Palestinian context.

As discussed in this chapter, the *Instrumentalist* approach has argued since 1993 that the fundamentals of the Oslo economic and aid framework are sound, and the model should be maintained. Rather, when the aid and development process begins to fail, it blames political elements exogenous to their model and argues that aid only needs to be applied better. This approach is quite neoliberal by nature and championed by the World Bank in particular. It tends to sanitize and decontextualize the Israeli military occupation, while rejecting the idea of the settler colonial nature of Israeli rule over the Palestinians. It also lays a disproportionate amount of blame on the Palestinians and Palestinian Authority for the failure of aid to achieve its anticipated results. *Critical Instrumentalism*,

meanwhile, argues that the Israeli occupation is the main obstacle to peace and development, and they consider aid and politics to be intrinsically linked. While being overall much more critical of Israeli rule as a determining factor in the failure of the Palestinian aid model, they retain an instrumentalist faith in the general model and the ability for good policy to bring about positive change. This approach is also not critical of the neoliberal normative values that define Palestinian aid and does not place Israeli policies within a settler colonial framework, but rather as a military occupation that may be temporary by nature.

The *Critics* argue that aid policy is a rationalizing technical discourse that conceals a hidden bureaucratic power or dominance, and that this hidden reality is the true political intention behind the development process. They believe the Oslo Accords' aid model—in the way it is implemented—is effectively part of the Israeli occupation and helps to reinforce its colonial dominance, because aid is designed in a way that subverts Palestinian development while reinforcing and subsidizing the Israeli colonial occupation. For *Critics*, development is in general not policy to be implemented, but domination to be resisted, and in the case of Israel-Palestine, it reinforces the occupation and settler colonial condition. They also argue that economic integration with Israel, advocated for by the *Instrumentalists*, benefits the occupier at the expense of the Palestinian economy.

Finally, the *Neo-Colonialist* approach considers aspects of foreign aid to have been a success and that aid to Palestinians is not failing at all. This approach considers aid as an economic incentive and instrument to offer to Palestinians in return for their giving up political rights and halting resistance to the occupation. Here the purpose of aid to Palestinians is to combat terrorism against Israel; encourage Palestinian peaceful coexistence with Israel; develop Palestinian institutions for self-governance; and meet humanitarian needs to prevent further destabilization (Zanotti 2012). This perspective has been advocated by multiple American think tanks and paved the way for the US Administration under Donald Trump to cut aid to Palestinians while pressuring them to advance the so-called *Peace to Prosperity* vision (White House 2020).

Based on the conceptual analysis of these four approaches (discussed below), the chapter concludes that any political economy driven analysis or framing of the impact of foreign aid in the Palestinian context necessitates recognition of the inherent embedded structures of power and harmful relations of settler colonial control (Fig. 10.1).




Fig. 10.1 Level of aid given to the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGs), 1993–2019 (*Source* As compiled by the authors based on OECD-DAC Aid Database and main statistics from Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics [PCBS])

THE INSTRUMENTALISTS: BELIEF IN THE “INVESTMENT IN PEACE” PARADIGM

The Palestinian economy is an aid dependent economy surviving under an ongoing Israeli settler colonial occupation (Tartir and Seidel 2019). The overarching Palestinian aid model is shaped by a 1993 World Bank development plan, “An Investment in Peace,” which informs the major bilateral donors who fund Palestinian development on how to disburse their aid (World Bank 1993). The *instrumentalist* approach adopted by the World Bank and major donors is highly bureaucratic, top-down, and visibly dominant both in the design and analysis of post-Oslo aid. It can be described as neoliberal by nature. As implied by the name of the plan, it was developed to improve Palestinians’ standards of living and to provide them with incentives to participate in the peace process (Le More 2008). Similar to other programs developed by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) for developing world countries in the 1990s, the Palestinian aid framework is economically neoliberal and aims to build institutions based on models of “good governance” (Khan 2010, 2014; Hickel 2012). Other core normative values the plan professes are open

markets, economic integration with Israel, regional economic integration, financial liberalization, and support for “democracy” (Khan et al. 2004; Khan 2009; Hanieh 2011). In the twenty-first century that aid policy evolved further linking itself to the security paradigm, where military and security planners consider underdevelopment a danger to global security (Duffield 2001). As such the instrumentalist aim has been to create—through its policy and aid intervention—a Palestinian state made in the image of the West, preparing Palestinians for independence from, and peaceful coexistence with, Israel.

As with other scenarios where aid is mainly about technical assistance but not real change or freedom (Ferguson 1994), Palestinian aid instrumentalists are persistently optimistic about the power of well-designed policy as a tool to solve real-world problems (on the power of policy, see Mosse 2005). The tendency of many of their studies, in line with “modernization theory,” is to conceptualize development as linear by nature, implying a kind of step-by-step process where development policy is formulated, implemented, and then followed by certain results that can be used to evaluate the extent to which the original objectives have been achieved (Long 1990). Perhaps *sine qua non* to such a bureaucratic approach, their natural starting point is to work with a central authority that in theory represents the people who are receiving aid. They perceive development objectives as a public good and this means that a hierarchical authority is required to structure networks both outward and downward for policy implementation (Brinkerhoff 1996). This is premised on the view that the political provision of public goods requires that one center of authority and responsibility, whose role is to utilize hierarchy and monopoly to guarantee effective coordination, control and efficient performance (Landau 1991). This need for a central state authority and institutions has been a primary motivating factor for donors backing the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the OPT as a starting point for development policy to be enacted.

Instrumentalists consider it highly important to make certain the central authority is “strong,” regardless if it is authoritarian in nature or pursues an undemocratic style of governance (on the authoritarian trends, see Tartir 2018). In fact, they often think authoritarian central authorities may be “better placed” to enact “good policy” defined by authorities in the donor community, like the IFIs. That authority can use its powers of hierarchy and monopoly to encourage but delicately balance out its own intervention into the economy to ensure markets

remain free. Here policy implementation networks function most effectively when combining markets and hierarchies to take advantage of the strengths of each, and to cover for the weaknesses of the other (Brinkerhoff 1996). Otherwise, if that delicate balance is not maintained, aid intervention could stray down the “failed” path of “socialist style” intervention, risking a systemic failure should one monopoly in the economy fail (Brinkerhoff 1996, 16–17).

This concept of balancing free markets with authority is based on a faith the instrumentalist approach has in the power of market forces to correct for inefficiency, incompetence, or abuse. It assumes that in the marketplace enough entities exist and can be identified to provide the required goods and services to foster wealth and discourage poverty (Brinkerhoff 1996, 16–17). For this reason, and by adopting a neoliberal ideology, the state should not be economically monopolistic and should encourage free market enterprise. Faith is also placed in the idea that the state can be a neutral, objective and representative entity, able to carry this approach out, even when authoritarian in nature.

These concepts underpin the World Bank’s “An Investment in Peace” and the 1994 “Paris Protocol” economic agreement that formalized a sort of customs union between Israel and the PA (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1994; Ahmad 2014; Arafah 2018; chapters by Iqtait and Dana in this edited volume). In one of the more egregious displays of inadequacy in the way donors approach Palestinian development, practitioners who adopt this approach seem to ignore the source cause of Palestinian misery: a settler colonial occupation that structurally and violently defines every aspect of their life. This was particularly true in the 1990s when an effort was made to make the occupation invisible to the point of never mentioning it. For what Le More describes as political reasons, the term “occupation” almost entirely vanished from the international discourse (Le More 2008: 29). This was in part justified on an argument that peace can only take place by avoiding pernicious political issues that can lead to unhelpful mutual recriminations, and derail “progress” that aid was seeking to foster. That contributed to the international community ignoring the structural violence carried out by Israel, while building colonial settlements considered illegal under international law, whose existence and growth were however the fundamental factor undermining the two-state model at the heart of the Oslo peace model. In this way, through a widespread adaptation of the instrumentalist approach the occupation became nearly whitewashed out of existence in the 1990s, to

the point of undermining the notion that Palestinians had land rights in the OPT. All of this contributed to the process of elimination and erasure, which is characteristic of settler colonialism (see Charrett and Seidel in this volume).

When the “good governance” project and World Bank model repeatedly fail to deliver desired outcomes, it is with equal repetition that practitioners in the instrumentalist approach blame exogenous factors such as political violence, or the Palestinians for not implementing policy well enough. They deflect blame rather than engage in inconvenient self-reflection to take into consideration flaws that may exist in their own approach. They also seem unwilling to challenge power in an asymmetrical relationship. In this way, political events become a complicating factor sabotaging well-designed aid models in what they assume is, fundamentally, a conceptually sound good governance project (Brynen 2000). Thus, reports by the World Bank, the architect of the instrumentalist model, place a disproportionate amount of blame on the PA for aid’s lack of results. They do this in spite of a well-established understanding that aid becomes a political factor in any conflict situation (Anderson 1999; Lester Murad 2014). They also conveniently forget that the PA is an institution of their own creation, a fact that “poses a serious challenge to their uniform analytical frameworks and rigid assumptions” (Taghdisi-Rad 2010, 42–43).

World Bank reports play a central role shaping external intervention (Tartir and Wildeman 2012). Their approach has always contrasted sharply with Roy’s assessment that Israel’s occupation was the key obstacle to development and peace (Roy 1999). Rather, if the Bank and other instrumentalists acknowledge the occupation, they typically show how it is unhelpful, but do not focus on it and instead work around it in their policy prescriptions. That is, they make avoiding its reality a priority, rather than challenging it. Their approach has no doubt been tied to, and augmented by, the bureaucratic and policymaking elite’s use of language that operated to sanitize the reality of occupation and colonization from policy assessments of the OPT (Le More 2008: 30). Acknowledging and challenging the settlements is equally if not more unlikely (Wildeman 2018a). Anyone working within this framework is forced to work within the confines of that way of thinking, to the point of their employment being in jeopardy (Wildeman 2017). As one of countless examples, a comprehensive 2000 World Bank and Government of Japan analysis of OPT development, carried out on the eve of the Second Intifada, blamed

a lack of positive outcomes in the Oslo aid and peace models on external political problems and poor policy implementation by the Palestinians, while almost never mentioning the occupation (World Bank 2000). Even as the Oslo process became less and less believable to people living with facts on the ground, over a period from 2009 to 2017 the Bank's key reporting to the donors became less and less contextually sound. In fact, one might forget when reading their reporting and policy advice, that settlements and occupation were even a leading problem for Palestinians and the establishment of their own state (Wildeman 2018b). At no time did they waver from maintaining the existing Oslo aid model.

The instrumentalist approach is based on deep misconceptions of the actual conditions of Palestine-Israel. It takes an approach to development and peacebuilding that is based on the false premise that there are two relatively equal sides engaged in a political dispute. That is a narrative which runs completely contrary to the reality of a gross power imbalance where Israel occupies OPT Palestinians through force. Instrumentalists display further deep logical fallacies in their approach by proposing that politics can somehow be kept separate from aid, all while ignoring the history (context) of the occupation and omitting information that does not reaffirm preexisting normative values (Pappé 2016). The settler colonial nature of the Israeli state's relationship with Palestinians is ignored in spite of remarkable historical consistency in Israeli policies of Palestinian land expropriation—policy which predates the formation of the state of Israel and occurs irrespective of which political party is in power (Pappé 2006; Masalha 2012). In fact, from the beginning the instrumentalists even miscategorized Israel-Palestine as a post-conflict situation, though the conflict never ended (CDS-BZU 2011).

Repetitive failure in the OPT has not dented the instrumentalist faith in policy or their own approach. Instrumentalists characteristically find success in any development program they are associated with, anyway, provided those programs are imbued with the “correct” (neoliberal) normative values (i.e. in this case good governance, democracy, open markets). For this reason, support for failed programs is renewed regardless of results, as values sit ahead of results in importance (Mosse 2005, 3–4). In this way instrumentalists habitually confirm self-fulfilling prophecies about the viability of the programs they have designed. So, while aid has not succeeded in bringing about peace and development as sought by the Palestinian people, instrumentalists still argue that the fundamentals of the program are sound because the norms are right. That is why “An

Investment in Peace” and the “Paris Protocols” have not been significantly amended or abandoned, while the post-Oslo aid process failed alongside the Oslo peace process.

CRITICAL INSTRUMENTALISTS: MAKING ADJUSTMENTS

As the aid and peace processes began visibly to fail with the unfolding of the Second Intifada in the early 2000s, an early and notable challenge to the instrumentalist model came from aid researchers and practitioners already working within its normative values. We refer to this approach as *critical instrumentalism*. Individuals who adopted this approach had personal experience with the existing instrumentalist approach, and saw how it had failed. Unlike the instrumentalist approach, they questioned the downplaying and sanitizing of the occupation, and making it invisible, which had been particularly common during the 1990s. They felt aid would not work unless the occupation (and power) was challenged and began to raise serious concerns that aid may be sustaining Israel’s military rule of the OPT. These early critics rose in prominence in the mid-2000s at the height of the Second Intifada, a period that sparked questions about the Oslo Peace Process and aid programming generally. They argued that only by dealing with the political question of occupation could development and peace take hold.

This stood in stark contrast to prevailing instrumentalist thought that politics needs to be separated from development, or to focus on technocracy over politics, for peace to take place. As Anne Le More (2008) wrote in her seminal book about the political economy of aid during the Second Intifada, the occupation had to be challenged and the aid model changed to account for it. From this viewpoint, the aid intervention cannot be effective until the root cause of conflict and Palestinian poverty, the occupation, is also dealt with politically. Specifically, they criticized the depoliticized nature of the instrumentalist approach. As one of the leading early voices in this shift, Le More (2008) says that donors did recognize early on that politics would necessarily impact the development process, yet somehow acted as if the aid effort in the OPT could proceed independently. That included offering insufficient attention to the continuing Israeli military occupation and the absence of Palestinian sovereignty (Le More 2005, 996). This despite how,

The Second Intifada clearly showed that cushioning the harmful impacts of Israeli policies on Palestinian territory, economy and society by giving money to the Palestinians encouraged, rather than disheartened, Israeli expansionist policy—donors did not even manage to prevent Israel from destroying the Palestinian infrastructure and institutional projects they had financed between 1994 and 2001. (Le More 2005, 997)

Still, the critical instrumentalist approach retained some values in common with instrumentalism. That includes faith in policy, in bureaucracy and a West-centric model for governance. They also remained generally comfortable with the normative values imbued in the Oslo model for development, including a linear approach to project implementation and the establishment of the PA as a central authority to structure networks both outward and downward for policy implementation. Further, they remained confident that development aid was necessary to encourage peace, and that good policy could make this happen:

There is little controversy about the international community's initial scheme to buttress the Oslo peace process by providing tangible benefits to the Palestinian population of the OPT. Aid is now the landmark of every post-conflict reconstruction and state-building enterprise and, if used adroitly, can go a long way to help stabilize a political process and cement a peace deal. (Le More 2005, 995)

They took the approach that, if Oslo Aid were to succeed, it must fully account for and challenge the contextual realities of occupation. They do not however account for settler colonialism and the logic of neoliberal capital as key factors undermining the development and peace process, and this segues to a third category we have identified in the nexus of Palestinian development aid (Box 10.1).

Box 10.1: Assessing Impact of Aid—Selected Main Findings (Knudsen and Tartir 2017)

- The current cooperation and international aid paradigm has reached its limits in the absence of a parallel constructive political track that addresses the key constraints of Israeli occupation, settlement policies and the political division of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
- Continued Israeli military occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip remains the primary reason for the failure of international aid

to achieve goals related to peace, human development and economic prosperity.

- The Palestinian Authority (PA) adopted donor-driven security sector reform (SSR) as the lynchpin of its post-2007 state-building project. The development process became highly securitized as nearly one third of the aid was allocated to the security sector.
- Due to the absence of effective accountability mechanisms in the international aid framework for Palestine, donors are not committed to the principles of aid effectiveness (Paris, Accra and Busan declarations) and the Do No Harm principles.
- Aid fatigue in the OPT is acknowledged in the donor community, but most donors are unwilling to revise the overall aid system or alter the economic framework of the Oslo Accords (Paris Economic Protocol arrangements).
- The annual losses to the Palestine economy due to the occupation are greater than current ODA aid volumes.

Source Knudsen and Tartir (2017)—Country Evaluation Report Commissioned by The Evaluation Department, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) and Carried out by Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI).

THE CRITICS: REINVENTING THE AID MODEL

As the debate in development theory will point out, agreement about the utility of aid is not universal (Mittelman 2018). The belief that policy need only be adjusted modestly to take account of the occupation opened space for a much sharper critique of aid, which gained traction as conditions continued to deteriorate in the OPT through the 2000s and onward. The *Critics* are altogether pessimistic about the power of policy to do good and took the sharpest departure from instrumentalism. The Critics consider the instrumentalist model to be a simplistic, neoliberal, one-size fits all, decontextualized and West-centric approach that was always doomed to fail once implemented in the OPT. That is because they observe how instrumentalist management models isolate aid intervention from history, politics, and social realities—including the legacy of colonialism—and then bend reality to match their internalized logic with self-fulfilling prophecies of success or failure (Mosse 2004), irrespective of results. Nor do critics agree with the simplicity of a linear

approach to development. Instead, they argue that enlightened planners and development workers will readily appreciate that a:

Separation of “policy”, “implementation” and “outcomes” is a gross oversimplification of a much more complicated set of processes which involve the reinterpretation or transformation of policy during the implementation process, such that there is no straight line from policy to outcomes. (Long 1990, 15)

That is, policy will be affected and should be amended to match the actual conditions of an intervention, while that intervention is taking place, accounting for change and mistakes. So, development is a dynamic process and policy should react as such. Further, social actors are not some disembodied social “category” created per a classification system. Nor are they just passive recipients of aid, but rather active participants who react to the processes of intervention affecting them. As a result, the precise paths of change and the significance for those involved can never be simply and straightforwardly imposed from the outside, nor can they be explained in terms of the working out of some inexorable structural logic such as a linear model of aid giving (Long 1990, 6–7).

Though some were writing prior to the Oslo process, critics have since the late 2000s been growing increasingly vociferous in their denunciation of the Oslo framework, the World Bank and the instrumentalist model. The continuous failure of the Oslo aid model gave rise to the critical voices, and their argument and analysis have proliferated in the literature, especially over the past decade (e.g., CDS-BZU 2011; Nakhleh 2012, 2014; Bisan Center for Research and Development 2013; Turner 2020). In fact, this approach likely became “the” dominant mode of analysis on aid in the academic literature in that period. Yet, the *Critics*, mostly academics, activists, and some think tanks, do not enjoy the institutional support of power over policy as bodies equivalent to the World Bank and major bilateral donor agencies, and the non-governmental entities they fund, which operate on a still explicitly instrumentalist model guided by the World Bank. Since the two approaches are largely hostile to one another, this lack of access ensures that the *Critics* are unable to reinvent the aid model, at least from the top-downward.

Though the *Critics* share in common an objective of reinventing the aid model, they cannot be seen as an analogous and harmonized group (Tartir 2015). Though the level of critique and “radicality” varies among

them, they share in common a belief that the existing instrumentalist approach is inherently flawed and having a deleterious effect on Palestinians. Though they have diverging views on what aid model may work, if aid can work at all, they do share in common a belief that the existing model needs to be done away with. At its worst, many critics believe aid is acting as a smokescreen obscuring a failed peace process, while helping to subsidize an occupation Israel should otherwise be paying for. They also believe aid policy is a rationalizing technical discourse that conceals a hidden bureaucratic power used to dominate the Palestinians and keep them quiescent. For Critics, this hidden reality has become the true political intention behind foreign aid, while the real basis for aid is not to empower Palestinians, but rather to dominate them politically and socially through financial means. In this way, development is not policy to be implemented better, but rather domination to be resisted (for further analysis on resistance toward global development aid generally, see Mosse 2005).

In contrast to critical instrumentalists, critics fault not just the Israeli occupation but also the policy process behind aid for the ongoing humanitarian crisis. In contrast to the instrumentalists, critics argue that economic integration has always benefitted Israel at the expense of the Palestinians (Hever 2010; Roy 2016). Unlike instrumentalists and critical instrumentalists, critics do not have confidence in the ability of policy to bring about positive change (Rodney 2018), and are highly critical of much of the normative values intrinsic to post-Oslo aid. They believe that the neoliberal aid model designed by the World Bank is both ineffective and harmful to Palestinians (Dana 2020b), in no small part due to it being decontextualized from facts on the ground. They point out that it led to economic decline, subverted Palestinian civil resistance and subsidized the occupation (Dana 2015a).

Critics actively seek out the unspoken and unwritten intent they believe exists for why policy is made and actions take place (Mosse 2005, 2), even if those hidden facts are difficult to locate and measure. As Pappé established, hidden meanings and intentions are intrinsic to understanding the actual history of the state of Israel and the Palestinians (Pappé 2006), and the high donor politics of aid is no different. As Challand points out, aid is never neutral, despite technocratic language that claims neutrality and objectivity:

Various studies highlight the fact that funding, despite its apparently technical and specialized outlook, is never truly neutral, and that behind the noble objectives of “development” lie much more straightforward political (and in some cases economic) interests. (Challand 2008, 410)

This parallels Morgenthau’s (1962) realist theoretical analysis of foreign aid, where he argues that foreign aid’s official structures mask the true political reasons it is being spent, in pursuit of power.

Since aid had been earlier de-linked from politics in the 1990s (Shikaki and Springer 2015), it was subverting Palestinian development, reinforcing the Israeli occupation and subsidizing a process of colonization (Leech 2012). Mandy Turner goes so far to suggest international aid in the OPT is a visible form of developmental counterinsurgency (Turner 2015), designed to “extend, uphold, and police an international system created by, and structured with, colonial relations of power” (Turner 2020). Turner further argues:

in the absence of political or economic pressure applied to Israel to allow a sovereign Palestinian state to emerge, it was inevitable that international aid would create structures and a political economy that worked in tandem with, rather than in opposition to, Israel’s rule. Aid is a stabilization and “development” strategy, and in the OPT these were pursued and undertaken in the context of Israeli settler colonialism because these structures of power and control were allowed to persist. (Turner 2020)

THE NEO-COLONIALISTS: ALIGNING AID WITH ISRAEL’S SETTLER COLONIALISM

Neocolonialism is a post-Imperial concept whereby a powerful state, typically from the Global North, uses economic, political, cultural, or other pressures to influence or control other, typically formerly colonized, countries of the poorer and weaker Global South. The United States regularly does this with the Palestinians, and the international donor community often as well. Although it is not exclusive to US intervention, the antecedents to the “Peace Dividend” model, a derivative of the Economic Peace framework lay in US policy dating back at least to the 1970s when the Carter administration started a depoliticized approach premised on the idea that “happy” Palestinians, who had steady employment and a functioning administrative structure, would be willing to negotiate for a

settlement while under occupation (Wildeman and Tartir 2019). In the 1980s, the Reagan administration proposed a “Quality of Life” initiative (Wildeman 2019), to promote political reconciliation between Israel and the Palestinians through economic inducements that were theoretically separated from politics, reflecting an argument that “Economics may be politics in the West Bank and Gaza, but the American government can and should attempt to separate the two for policy purposes” (Starr 1989, 38). While couched in the technocratic jargon of instrumentalism, the US intention clearly included exerting political dominance over the Palestinians. The same policy thinkers who argued for an apolitical aid program also argued that aid should go only to Palestinians with the “right” politics (Starr 1989, 40).

They also conveniently worked around Israel’s long-running rejection of development aid that empowers Palestinian independence. By 1993 the Cold War had ended and the United States was the lone hegemonic power left in the Middle East. This would allow it to establish an aid model based on its past proposed peace dividend, while establishing a dominant position as the “arbiter” overseeing the Oslo Peace Process. The United States meanwhile was anything but an impartial mediator. It held extremely close political and military ties with Israel, which included providing Israel with billions of dollars in advanced military aid per year. This alliance is so tight that it represents the centerpiece of US Middle East policy, to the point that the United States will set aside its own security concerns to advance the interests of Israel as one-and-the-same (Mearsheimer and Walt 2008).

The Clinton administration in the 1990s adopted the notion of peace dividends and promised a new era of prosperity. The Bush administration proposed the “Roadmap for Peace” initiative in 2003 and put economic growth and investments at the center of a future “peace process” (Dana 2015b). A June 2012 *Congressional Research Service Report* noted that successive Administrations have requested aid for the Palestinians to support at least three major US policy priorities of interest to Congress: (a) combating, neutralizing, and preventing terrorism against Israel from the Islamist group Hamas and other militant organizations; (b) creating a virtuous cycle of stability and prosperity in the West Bank that inclines Palestinians—including those in the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip—toward peaceful coexistence with Israel and prepares them for self-governance; (c) meeting humanitarian needs and preventing further destabilization, particularly in the Gaza Strip (Zanotti 2012).

In 2013, the Obama administration proposed the “Kerry’s Billions” initiative to boost the Palestinian economy by up to 50% and help “transform the fortunes of a future Palestinian state” (Tartir 2014). The Trump administration followed suit, although it took further drastic decisions and measures in comparison with previous US administrations concerning the final status issues, including Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees. There it proposed in 2020 in their *Peace to Prosperity* plan a vision that is based on the same economic flawed rationale.

The Critics argue that aid is actually assisting Israel in its occupation and settler colonization of the OPT (Hanieh 2013), and the critical instrumentalists recognized that aid may be subsidizing the occupation, too. The Critics further recognize that aid and a peace dividend may have been used to subdue the Palestinians politically by requiring them to forgo their political rights in return for desperately needed funding (Wildeman and Tartir 2013). This is most apparent by the Trump administration’s withdrawal of Palestinian aid funding as a tool meant to coerce them into agreeing to political outcomes. Though a more extreme version of US intervention, a neocolonial approach in support of Israeli policy has largely defined American aid policy to the Palestinians and the larger region, providing Israel with support to maintain control over the Palestinians, even if that meant effective support for settler colonialism.

Only The Critics appreciate, acknowledge, and challenge settler colonialism as a phenomenon in their analysis. Following the 1967 occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Israeli government adopted the “open bridges” policy, designed by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan to make the “occupation invisible” (Dana 2015b). It aimed to endorse “limited economic modernization through agricultural and light-industry projects in Palestinian lands in order to pacify the population and disrupt the political foundation of the Palestinian anti-colonial struggle” (ibid.). In the 1980s, Israeli policy in the OPT social services sector appeared to be oriented toward safeguarding social conditions to facilitate political pacification, devolve the costs of occupation to others whenever possible, and to retain the advantages of a mixed political system that retains control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Brynen 2000, 42). In the 1990s, then-Foreign Minister Shimon Peres put forward his idea of a “New Middle East” which proposed a process of regional economic integration beyond the Palestinian territories. More recently, Benjamin Netanyahu advocated for an “economic peace strategy” in the West Bank to illustrate the fruits of a security collaboration and coordination model

that ensures stability in the status quo as a panacea for economic growth (Dana 2020a). Of course, the status quo is Israeli settler colonization of the OPT and dispossession and elimination of Palestinians from much of their land.

These Israeli approaches have three common features. First, they all worked in tandem with the US-driven neo-colonialist approach to aid in exercising control over the Palestinians in support of Israel. Second, they all—to varying degrees—found different sorts of Palestinian counterparts to collaborate with through complex financial mechanisms and bureaucratic structures, yet failing to convince the Palestinian people to surrender and give up their political rights overall. Third, they could depend on the United States influencing and shaping how, overall, the international community funded Palestinian aid at a structural level. Even when donors did not adopt an explicitly neocolonialist approach, it was quite easy to work with them if they adopted an instrumentalist approach that does not challenge power, and made the World Bank a particularly helpful partner, given its role as the guide of the overall donor model.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we identified four main categories to describe the approaches that policymakers, analysts and scholars have taken with foreign aid in the OPT, over the course of nearly thirty years of evolution in the Oslo Peace Process. The *instrumentalist* approach has been both dominant and deeply unsuccessful at achieving its *de jure* aims. This is almost certainly due to its unwillingness to acknowledge the political processes of occupation and settler colonialism that have rendered Oslo impossible, combined with a conviction of faith in the ability of their policy models to bring about progressive change. The *critical instrumentalist* approach shares an instrumentalist faith in good policy being a force for positive social change, but believes for this to happen, the occupation needs to be addressed and challenged. The *Critics* meanwhile perceive aid policy to be part of the problem; hence aid is an instrument reinforcing oppressive processes that need to be resisted. That includes resistance to both the occupation and settler colonialism, the latter which Critics clearly consider aid policy to be reinforcing. The *neocolonial* approach has no problem with the presence and entrenchment of the Israeli occupation or colonialism, but rather with finding ways to help shape the Palestinians toward alignment with Israel's policy.

It is evident by now that the aid flow, however big it becomes, will never be effective if it continues to be poured into the skewed and distorted political and economic frameworks of the existing (failed) Oslo model. In fact, more money can lead to more harm when spent in an improper intervention. Similarly, technical solutions alone, regardless of how good they may seem on paper, will always fall short of addressing the real problems Palestinians face, if they avoid addressing the central political realities of the conflict (Tartir 2017a). It is therefore inevitable that a shift should take place in prevailing development thought, from one that considers development as a technocratic, apolitical, and neutral approach (instrumentalism) to approaches that recognize structures of power and relations of colonial dominance, some of which rearticulate processes of development as linked to the struggle for rights, resistance, and emancipation (Tartir et al. 2012; Dana 2020c; Seidel's chapter in this edited volume). Yet, even if that shift has taken place at a scholarly level, it has not yet translated to change in policy by the international donor community, or even by authorities on the ground in the OPT who receive aid funding.

By looking at Palestinian aid through these different categories, it appears the model defined by the dominant instrumentalist approach has only served to obscure the real structural neocolonialist reasons behind aid being given. While aid has clearly failed in its mission to build peace in the Middle East, tens-of-billions of dollars in funding would not continue to have been given, were it not fulfilling some other underlying political aim and satisfying other structural processes. The neoliberal architecture of the model built by instrumentalists provides Israel with financial and political support to maintain a profitable occupation over the OPT and to keep building settler colonies in it, all while keeping Palestinians quiet through financial buy-offs under the guise of ongoing development and peace processes. Considered from this standpoint, foreign aid might be succeeding as assistance for Israel in the completion of its colonization of historic Palestine.

REFERENCES

- Ahmad, Amal. 2014. "The Customs Union and Israel's No-State Solution." *Al-Shabaka Policy Brief*. Available at <https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/the-customs-union-and-israels-no-state-solution/>.

- Anderson, Mary. 1999. *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace-or War*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.
- Arafeh, Nur. 2018. "Long Overdue: Alternatives to the Paris Protocol." *Al-Shabaka Policy Brief*. Available at <https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/long-overdue-alternatives-paris-protocol/>.
- Baconi, Tareq. 2020. "Israel's Annexation Plan, a New Era in Palestinian Resistance." *The New York Review of Books*. Available at <https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2020/07/02/israels-annexation-plan-a-new-era-in-palestinian-resistance/>.
- Bisan Center for Research and Development. 2013. *Critical Studies in Development in Palestine*. Ramallah: Bisan Center for Research and Development.
- Brinkerhoff, Derick. 1996. Coordination Issues in Policy Implementation Networks: An Illustration from Madagascar's Environmental Action Plan. *World Development* 24 (9): 1497–1510.
- Brynen, Rex. 2000. *A Very Political Economy: Peacebuilding and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and Gaza*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- CDS-BZU. 2011. "Public Debate on Alternatives to Aid and Neoliberal Development in the OPT" (unpublished). Center for Development Studies, Birzeit University.
- Challand, Benoit. 2008. "The Evolution of Western Aid for Palestinian Civil Society: Bypassing Local Knowledge and Resources." *Middle Eastern Studies* 44 (3): 397–417.
- Dana, Tariq. 2015a. "The Structural Transformation of Palestinian Civil Society: Key Paradigm Shifts." *Middle East Critique* 24 (2): 191–210.
- Dana, Tariq. 2015b. "The Symbiosis Between Palestinian 'Fayyadism' and Israeli 'Economic Peace': The Political Economy of Capitalist Peace in the Context of Colonization." *Conflict, Security & Development* 15 (5): 455–477.
- Dana, Tariq. 2020a. "Trump's Middle East Plan May Have a Silver Lining." *Aljazeera*, February 2. Available at <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/50bn-palestine-200201170559063.html>.
- Dana, Tariq. 2020b. "Crony Capitalism in the Palestinian Authority: A Deal among Friends." *Third World Quarterly* 41 (2): 247–263.
- Dana, Tariq. 2020c. "Localising the Economy as a Resistance Response: A Contribution to the "Resistance Economy" Debate in the Occupied Palestinian Territories." *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 15 (2). <https://doi.org/10.1177/1542316620925274>.
- Duffield, Mark. 2001. *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*. London: Zed Books.
- Ferguson, James. 1994. *The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

- Hanieh, Adam. 2011. "Development as Struggle: Confronting the Reality of Power in Palestine." Paper presented at Development in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Workshop, Center for Development Studies, Birzeit University, Ramallah, Palestine, June 23.
- Hanieh, Adam. 2013. *Lineages of Revolt: Issues of Contemporary Capitalism in the Middle East*. London: Haymarket.
- Hawari, Yara. 2020. "Beyond Failed Frameworks: A Re-imagined Collective Future." *Al-Shabaka Policy Brief*. Available at <https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/beyond-failed-frameworks-a-re-imagined-collective-future/>.
- Hever, Shir. 2010. *The Political Economy of Israel's Occupation: Repression beyond Exploitation*. London: Pluto Press.
- Hickel, Jason. 2012. "The World Bank and the Development Delusion." *Aljazeera*, September 27. Available at <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/09/201292673233720461.html>.
- Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1994. "Gaza-Jericho Agreement Annex IV-Economic Protocol." Available at <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/gaza-jericho%20agreement%20annex%20iv%20-%20economic%20protoco.aspx>.
- Khan, Mushtaq. 2009. "Palestinian State Formation since the Signing of the Oslo Accords." Available at http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/9964/1/Palestinian_State_Formation_since_Oslo_Internet.pdf.
- Khan, Mushtaq. 2010. "Post-Oslo State-Building Strategies and their Limitations." Paper presented at the Yusuf Sayigh Development Lecture, December 2010. The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), Ramallah, Palestine.
- Khan, Mushtaq. 2014. "Learning the Lessons of Oslo: Statebuilding and Freedoms in Palestine." In *Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond*, edited by Mandy Turner and Omar Shweiki, 238–256. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Khan, Mushtaq, George Giacaman, and Inge Amundsen (eds.). 2004. *State Formation in Palestine: Viability and Governance during a Social Transformation*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Knudsen, Are, and Alaa Tartir. 2017. "Country Evaluation Report." Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) and Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI). Available at https://alaatartirdotcom.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/5-17-country-evaluation-brief_palestine.pdf.
- Landau, Martin. 1991. "On Multiorganizational Systems in Public Administration." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 1 (1): 5–18.
- Le More, Anne. 2005. "Killing with Kindness: Funding the Demise of a Palestinian State." *International Affairs* 81 (5): 981–999.

- Le More, Anne. 2008. *International assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Leech, Philip. 2012. "Re-reading the Myth of Fayyadism: A Critical Analysis of the Palestinian Authority's Reform and State-building Agenda, 2008-2011." Research Paper, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies.
- Lester Murad, Nora. 2014. "Donor Complicity in Israel's Violations of Palestinian Rights." *Al-Shabaka Policy Brief*. Available at <https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/donor-complicity-in-israels-violations-of-palestinian-rights/>.
- Long, Norman. 1990. "From Paradigm Lost to Paradigm Regained? The Case for an Actor-oriented Sociology of Development." *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 49: 3-24.
- Masalha, Nur. 2012. *Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*. Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies.
- Mearsheimer, John, and Stephen Walt. 2008. *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy*. London: Penguin.
- Mittelman, James. 2018. "The Development Paradigm and Its Critics." In *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, edited by R. A. Denmark, 930-948. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Morgenthau, Hans. 1962. "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid." *The American Political Science Review* 56 (2): 301-309.
- Mosse, David. 2004. "Is Good Policy Unimplementable? Reflections on the Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice." *Development and Change* 35 (4): 639-671.
- Mosse, David. 2005. *Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice*. London and Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press.
- Nakhleh, Khalil. 2012. *Globalized Palestine: The National Sell-out of a Homeland*. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press.
- Nakhleh, Khalil. 2014. "Oslo: Replacing Liberation with Economic Neo-Colonialism." *Al-Shabaka Policy Brief*. Available at <https://al-shabaka.org/commentaries/oslo-replacing-liberation-with-economic-neo-colonialism/>.
- OECD. 2020. "QWIDS Query Wizard for International Development Statistics." OECD-DAC Aid Database April. Available at <https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/>.
- Pappé, Ilan. 2006. *Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*. Oxford: Oneworld Publications.
- Pappé, Ilan. 2016. "Historiophobia or the Enslavement of History: The Role of the 1948 Ethnic Cleansing in the Contemporary Peace Process." *Arab Studies Quarterly* 38 (1): 402-417.
- PCBS. 2020. "Main Statistics from Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS)." Available at http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/site/lang_en/507/default.aspx.

- Rodney, Walter. 2018. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. London and New York: Verso.
- Roy, Sara. 1987. "The Gaza Strip: A Case of Economic De-Development." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 17 (1): 56–88.
- Roy, Sara. 1995. *The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development*. Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies.
- Roy, Sara. 2007. *Failing Peace: Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict*. London: Pluto Press.
- Roy, Sara. 2014. "The Palestinian People and the Political Economy of De-development: Contesting Colonization, Negating Neoliberalism." In *Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond*, edited by Mandy Turner and Omar Shweiki, X–XIII. London: Routledge.
- Roy, Sara. (ed.). 1999. *The Economics of Middle East Peace: A Reassessment*. Stamford, CT: Jai Press.
- Roy, Sara. 2016. *The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-development*, Expanded 3rd ed. Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies.
- Shikaki, Ibrahim, and Joanna Springer. 2015. "Building a Failed State: Palestine's Governance and Economy Delinked." *Al-Shabaka Policy Brief*. Available at <https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/building-a-failed-state/>.
- Starr, Joyce. 1989. "Development Diplomacy." Policy Papers 12, Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Available at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/development-diplomacy-u.s.-economic-assistance-to-the-west-bank-and-gaza>.
- Taghdisi-Rad, Sahar. 2010. *The Political Economy of Aid in Palestine: Relief from Conflict or Development Delayed?* London and New York: Routledge.
- Tartir, Alaa, and Timothy Seidel (eds.). 2019. *Palestine and Rule of Power: Local Dissent vs. International Governance*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Tartir, Alaa, and Jeremy Wildeman. 2012. "Persistent Failure: World Bank Policies for the Occupied Palestinian Territories." *Al-Shabaka Policy Brief*. Available at <http://al-shabaka.org/node/513>.
- Tartir, Alaa. 2014. "Kerry's Billions: US Economic Plans for Palestine Place Investment over Freedom." *Mondoweiss*. Available at <https://mondoweiss.net/2014/01/economic-palestine-investment/>.
- Tartir, Alaa. 2015. "Contentious Economics in Occupied Palestine." In *Contentious Politics in the Middle East*, edited by F. Gerges, 469–499. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Tartir, Alaa. 2017a. "International Aid to Palestinians: A Cursed Gift." *Current Anthropology* 58 (3): 317–339.
- Tartir, Alaa. 2017b. "International Aid to Palestine: Time to Change Course." *Middle East Eye*. Available at <https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/international-aid-palestine-time-change-course>.

- Tartir, Alaa. 2018. "The Limits of Securitized Peace: The EU's Sponsorship of Palestinian Authoritarianism." *Middle East Critique* 27 (4): 365–381.
- Tartir, Alaa, Sam Bahour, and Samer Abdelnour. 2012. "Defeating Dependency, Creating a Resistance Economy." *Al-Shabaka Policy Brief*. Available at <http://al-shabaka.org/node/377>.
- Turner, Mandy. 2015. "Peacebuilding as Counterinsurgency in the Occupied Palestinian Territory." *Review of International Studies* 41 (1): 73–98.
- Turner, Mandy. 2020. "International Aid in the Absence of Palestinian Sovereignty: Notes towards a Strategy in the Aftermath of the Trump 'Peace Plan.'" *Jadaliyya*. Available at <https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/40706/International-Aid-in-the-Absence-of-Palestinian-Sovereignty-Notes-towards-a-Strategy-in-the-Aftermath-of-the-Trump-Peace-Plan>.
- UNCTAD. 2019. "Report on UNCTAD Assistance to the Palestinian people: Developments in the Economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory." United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva. Available at https://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/tdbex68d4_en.pdf.
- White House. 2020. "Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People." Available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/peacetoprospersity/>.
- Wildeman, Jeremy. 2017. "Undermining the Democratic Process: The Canadian Government Suppression of Palestinian Development Aid Projects." *The Canadian Journal for Middle East Studies* 2 (1): 1–30.
- Wildeman, Jeremy. 2018a. "Donor Aid Effectiveness and Do No Harm in the Occupied Palestinian Territory." *Aid Watch Palestine*. Available at http://www.aidwatch.ps/sites/default/files/resource-field_media/Aid%20Effectiveness%20%26%20Do%20No%20Harm%20in%20OPT-%20Final-compressed_1.pdf.
- Wildeman, Jeremy. 2018b. "EU Development Aid in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, between Aid Effectiveness and World Bank Guidance." *Global Affairs* 4 (1): 115–128.
- Wildeman, Jeremy. 2019. "This Is Why the 'Deal of the Century' Is Just Old Wine in a New Bottle." *TRT World*. Available at <https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/this-is-why-the-deal-of-the-century-is-just-old-wine-in-a-new-bottle-27850>.
- Wildeman, Jeremy, and Alaa Tartir. 2019. "Why Cutting US Aid Will Help Palestinians - and Peace." *Middle East Eye*. Available at <https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/why-cutting-us-aid-will-help-palestinians-and-peace>.
- Wildeman, Jeremy, and Alaa Tartir. 2013. "Can Oslo's Failed Aid Model Be Laid to Rest?" *Al-Shabaka Policy Brief*. Available at <https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/can-oslos-failed-aid-model-be-laid-rest/>.

- Wildeman, Jeremy, and Alaa Tartir. 2014. "Unwilling to Change, Determined to Fail: Donor Aid in Occupied Palestine in the Aftermath of the Arab Uprisings." *Mediterranean Politics* 19 (3): 431–449.
- World Bank. 1993. *Developing the Occupied Territories: An Investment in Peace*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- World Bank. 2000. *Aid Effectiveness in the West Bank and Gaza*. Washington, DC: World Bank and Government of Japan.
- Zanotti, Jim. 2012. "U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, Congressional Research Service." Available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22967.pdf> and <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-207995/>.